The Delhi Sultanate was not absolutely free from external danger during this reign. In A.D. 1328-l329 the Chaghatai chief, Tarmashirin Khan, of Transoxiana invaded India. He ravaged the plains of the Punjab and reached the outskirts of Delhi. The change of the capital from Delhi, and probably the weak defence of the north-west frontier by the Delhi rulers, gave him the opportunity for this ambitious design. According to Yahiya bin Ahmad and Badauni, Muhammad bin Tughluq defeated him and drove him out of the country, while Ferishta writes that the Sultan bought him off by paying large presents in gold and jewels, which he describes “as the price of the kingdom”. Be that as it may, “the invasion was no more than a raid, and Tarmashirin disappeared as suddenly he had come”.
Like ‘Ala-ud-din, Muhammad bin Tughluq cherished extravagant visions of universal conquest. Encouraged by some Khurasani nobles, who had come to the Sultan’s court, being tempted by his lavish generosity, and had their selfish motives to serve, the latter formed, during the early years of his reign, the ambitious design of conquering Khursan and Irak and mobilised a huge army for this purpose. Barni writes that 370,000 men were enrolled in the Diwan-i-arz or muster-master’s office and were paid by the State for one full year. It is indeed true that Khursan was then in a state of disorder under its profligate monarch Abu Said, which might be taken advantage of by any external enemy. But its conquest was certainly an impossible task on the part of the Sultan of Delhi, whose authority could hardly be regarded as being established on a secure basis throughout his own kingdom, especially in the Deccan. There were also geographical and transport difficulties of no insignificant nature. To mobilise a large army through the passes of the Hindukush or the Himalayas, and arrange for its provisions in distant lands, were tasks of gigantic magnitude. It is also worthy of consideration how far it was possible for the Delhi soldiers, who had so long gained successes against the weak and divided Indian powers, to measure their strength successfully with the hardy hordes of Central Asia. Further, Tarmashirin Khan the Chaghatai chief, and the Sultan of Egypt, both of whom coveted the eastern and western frontiers of the distracted Persian Empire, were insincere allies of the Delhi Sultan, more determined to serve their own interests than help him in his projected invasion. Thus the Delhi Sultan’s “scheme was impolitic in the highest degree” from every point of view. It had to be abandoned, probably for lack of money. Barni writes: “The coveted countries were not acquired . . . and his treasure, which is the true source of political power, was expended.” Muhammad bin Tughluq never entertained the fantastic idea of conquering Tibet and China. But Barni, a contemporary officer, and Ibn Batutah clearly refer to his design of “capturing the mountain of Kara-jal . . . which lies between the territories of Hind (India) and those of China”. Evidently the expedition was directed against some refractory tribes in the Kumaun-Garhwal region with the object of bringing them under the control of the Delhi Sultan. A large army was sent from Delhi in the year A.D. 1337-1338 under the command of an able general.
But after an initial success, the Delhi troops suffered terribly owing to geographical difficulties, setting in of the rains, and lack of provisions. Only a few of them (ten according to Barni, three according to Ibn Batutah) survived to relate the story of the tragic fate of the expedition. Its immediate objective was, however, gained, as the hillmen came to terms and agreed to pay tribute to the Delhi Sultan.
But the cumulative effect of all the fantastic projects of Muhammad bin Tughluq proved disastrous for him. They caused immense miseries to the people of his kingdom, who were afflicted at the same time by the ravages of famine, and finally exhausted their patience. Popular discontent found expression in open revolts against the Sultan’s authority, and his whole reign was distracted by repeated rebellions, which increased the severity of his temper, undermined his prestige and authority, and accelerated the dismemberment of his vast empire.
The two early rebellions were put down with comparative ease, and the insurgents were given exemplary punishments. Baha-ud-din Gurshasp sister’s son to Ghiyas-ud-din Tughluq and so first cousin to Muhammad bin Tughluq, who held the fief of Sagar, situated about ten miles north of Shorapur in the Deccan, refused to recognize the Sultan’s authority and rebelled against him in A.D. 1326 or 1327. But he was captured by the imperialists, and sent to Delhi. He was flayed alive there, his dead body was paraded round the city, and his execution was proclaimed by way of warning to others: “Thus shall all traitors to their king perish.” A more serious rebellion, which broke out in the next year, was that of Bahram Aiba, surnamed Kishlu Khan, who held the fiefs of Uch, Sind and Multan. Muhammad bin Tughluq, who was then at Devagiri, marched to Multan by way of Delhi and inflicted a crushing defeat on the rebel in a fight in the plain of Abuhar. The Sultan was inclined to order a general massacre of the inhabitanti of Multan, but was restrained from doing so by the saint Rukn-ud-din. Bahram was captured and beheaded and his head was hung up in the gate of the city of Multan by way of warning to persons of rebellious disposition. But the suppression of these two rebellions did not in any way strengthen the Sultan’s position. Rather, from A.D. 1335 his fortunes began to wane and his authority to be openly defied by Hindu chiefs and Muslim governors of provinces, who were even emboldened to assert their independence. Taking advantage of the Sultan’s engagements in Northern India, Jalal-ud-din Ahsan Shah, governor of Ma`bar, proclaimed himself independent in A.D. 1335 and struck coins in his own name. The Sultan marched in person against him, but on reaching Warangal, was forced by an outbreak of cholera in his camp to retreat to Daulatabad. Thus came into existence the independent Muslim kingdom of Madura, which existed till A.D. 1377-1378, when it fell before the rising State of Vijayanagar. This kingdom of Vijayanagar was founded according to tradition in A.D. 1336.
In the north, Fakhr-ud-din Mubarak Shah, governor of the province of Bengal, the loyalty of which to the Delhi Sultanate had been always dubious, soon threw off his allegiance to it in A.D. 1338 and struck coins in his own name. The Sultan of Delhi, then preoccupied with other troubles, could do nothing to subdue him, and Bengal thus became an independent province. Rebellions followed in quick succession also in other parts of the Empire, the most formidable one being that of ‘Ain-ul-mulk, the governor of Oudh and Zafarabad, in A.D. 1340-41. All these were indeed put down by the end of the year A.D. 1342, but they badly affected the resources of the State, exhausted the energy of the Sultan and damped his spirits.
In this extremely embarrassing situation, the Sultan sought pontifical recognition to strengthen his waning authority by obtaining a patent from the ‘Abbasid Khalifah of Egypt. The desired patent came and Muhammad bin Tughluq caused his name to be replaced by that of the Khalifah on the Khutba and the coins. But his object was not fulfilled. The loyalty and confidence of his people had been too rudely shaken to be restored by the force of the Khalifah’s patent. In fact, no one had questioned the Sultan’s title to the throne; but it was his policy and measures which were not to the liking of his subjects.
The Sultan was faced with serious difficulties in almost all parts of his kingdom. In Telingana, Prolaya Nayaka, and after him his nephew, Kapaya Nayaka, organised a Hindu national movement against Muslim rule, with the assistance of the Hoysala king, Vira Ballala III. A similar movement was started in the region along the Krishna. The ultimate result was the establishment of the Hindu Kingdom of Vijayanagar and a few other Hindu principalities in the Deccan. The Sultan’s persecution of the “Centurions” (amiran-i-Sadah) aggravated his troubles and “insurrection followed upon insurrection”. The foreign Amirs revolted in Devagiri and the foundation of the Bahmani kingdom was laid by Abul Muzaffar ‘Ala-ud-din Bahman Shah, early in August, 1347. When the Sultan proceeded to quell a disturbance in one part, another broke out in a different quarter. While thus occupied in chasing the rebels in Sind, he was attacked with fever near Tattah and died on 20th March, A.D. 1351. “And so,” remarks Badauni, ” the king was freed from his people and they from their king.” In fact, the wholereign of Muhammad bin Tughluq dragged on through baffled aims to a pathetic end, marked by the dismemberment, of his vast empire of twenty-three provinces. There can be no doubt that the Sultan himself was largely responsible for this tragedy. Endowed with extraordinary intellect and industry, he lacked the essential qualities of a constructive statesman, and his ill-advised measures and stern policy enforced in disregard of popular will, sealed the doom of his empire.
