Next came the turn of the Qutb Shahi kingdom of Golkunda. Early in February, 1687, Aurangzeb himself appeared before Golkunda and the Mugbul troops besieged the local fortress within a few days. But the citadel was well stocked with food and ammunition, which enabled the besieged to hold out bravely for about eight months. In spite of using every possible m mines, bombardments and escalades-the besiegers could achieve no definite success but were h by famine and pestilence and incurred heavy losses from the r-ep of their enemies. Aurangzeb, however, held on with grim tenacity and gathered fresh reinforcements. On the failure of valour and arms, Aumngzeb, following the example of Akbar before Asirgarb, made use of “the golden key ” to capture Golkunda. An Afghan soldier of forture named ‘Abdullah Pani, then employed in the service of Abul Hasan, the Sultin of Golkunda, was suborned by the Emperor and allowed the Mughuls to pour into the fort by opening its main gate. But one faithful Golkunda noble, ‘Abdur Razzaq Lari, spurned the Emperor’s tempting offers of money and fought single-handed till he fell covered with seventy wounds. He was nursed back to recover by the Mughuls and at last accepted a high rank under the Emperor. ‘Abul Hasan :was sent off to the fortress of Daulatibad to spend his last days on a pension of Rs. 50)000 a year, and Golkunda was annexed (September, 1687) to the Mughul Empire.
According to writers like Elphinstone and Smith, the annihilation of the Southern Sult&nates was an impolitic step on the part of Aurangzab. They hold that it “freed the Maratha chiefs from any fear of local rivalry”, which the Mugbul Emperor might have ut to his advantage against the Marathas. But it is doubtful if any sincere, alliance between the Sultantes and their aggressor, the Mughul Emperor, was possible and also if they could check the rise of the Marathas. As Sir J. N. Sarkar observes, “since Akbar had crossed the Vindhyas, the Deccan SultAnates could never forget that the sleepless aim of the Mughul Emperors was the final extinction and annexation of all their territories He also points out ‘that it would have been impossible for the decadent Sultanates to check the Marathas effectively as they had already organized themselves into a progressive national State.
Having achieved one of the two objects of his Deccan policy, that is, the annexation of the decadent Sultanates of the Deccan, Aurngzeb turned towards the other, that is, the suppression of the renascent Maratha power. His attempts were at first crowned with success. Shambhuji was executed on the 11th March, 1689, his capital Raigarh was captured, and though his brother, Raja ram escaped, the rest of his family, including his young son, Shahu, were made prisoners. In the course of the next few years the Emperor extended his conquests further south and levied tribute on the Hindu States of Tanjore and Trichinopoly.
In fact by the year 1600 Aurangzeb had already reached the zenith of his power and was the lord paramount of almost the whole of India-from Kabul to Chittagong and from Kashmir to the Kaveri. “All seemed to have been gained by Aurangzeb now; but in reality all was lost. It was the beginning of his end. The saddest and most hopeless chapter of his life was now opened. The Mughul Empire had become too large to be governed by one man or from one centre. . . . His enemies rose on all sides; he could defeat but not crush them for ever. . . . Lawlessness reigned in many places of Northern and Central India. The old Emperor in the far-off Deccan lost all control over his officers in Hindustan, and the administration grew slack and corrupt; chiefs and zamindara defied the local authorities and asserted themselves, filling the country with tumult. In the province of Agra in particular, there was chromic disorder. Art and learning decayed at the withdrawal of Imperial patronage; not a single edifice, finely written manuscript, or exquisite picture, commemorates Aurangzeb’s reign. The endless war in the Deccan exhausted his treasury; the government turned bankrupt, the soldiers, starving from arrears of pay, mutinied; and during the closing years of his reign the revenue of Bengal, regularly sent by the able diwan Murshid Quli Khan, was the sole support of the Emperor’s household or his army, and its arrival was eagerly looked forward to. Napoleon I used to say, It was the Spanish ulcer which ruined me’. The Deccan ulcer ruined Aurangzeb.” The Emperor failed to subjugate the Marathas or conquer their land. They recovered by 1691 and carried on a war of national resistance against the Mughuls, first under Rajaram and some other able Maratha chiefs, and then, after Rajaram’s death in 1700, under his brave widow Tara Bai.
Last Days of Aurangzeb
Thus, as years rolled on, Aurangzeb saw before his eyes failure piled upon failure and his Empire exhausted. Fear for the future of the Empire filled his mind with anguish, and made him extremely unhappy. His advice to his rebellious tons to save the Empire by partition went unheeded. Conscious of his failure and seriously apprehensive of the imminent disaster, he wrote to his son ‘A’ zam: ” I came alone and am going alone. I have not done well to the country and the people, and of the future there is no hope.” To Kam Bakhsh he wrote: “I carry away the burden of my shortcomings. . . . Come what may, I am launching my boat. ” The deep pathos of these letters is bound to move every human heart and to rouse in it sympathy for the old monarch on his “lonely death-bed”. Worn out in mind and body by heavy cares and hard toil, the Emperor died at Ahmadnagar in the morning of the 3rd March, 1707, “with the Muslim confession of faith on his lips”. His body was carried to Daulatabad and was interred in the compound of the tomb of the famous Muslim saint Burhan-ud-din.
Aurangzeb as a Man and a Ruler
To judge the character and policy of a personality like Aurangzeb is indeed a perplexing, task. Some have taken into consideration mainly his faults, and not his good qualities, which they have mostly ignored. There is -no reason why he should be singled out for severe strictures for the manner in which he secured the throne. In this, he was simply following the example that had become almost traditional in the Timurid family in India. It would be unjust to throw on him the entire responsibility for the war of succession; it would have come at any rate, as none of the brothers was willing to make any compromise. It should not be forgotten that while Sh&h Jaha removed all his possible rivals Aurangzeb did not put to death all his nephews. It is indeed hard to defend Aurangzeb’s harsh treatment of his old father, but, in justice to him it should be noted that at least he was not a parricide, of which we find numerous instances in the history of India and of other countries.
