The reception of the Russian envoy in Kabul made the relations between the Amir and the British Government acute. With the previous approval of the Home Government, Lytton informed the Amir that an English envoy would be sent to Kabul. The mission was actually despatched through the Khyber Pass, but it was stopped near ‘Ali Masjid on 21st September. On 2nd November Lytton sent an ultimatum to the Amir, threatening war if the latter did not reply, accepting the mission, by the 20th. The Amir now appealed to Russia for help. But in the meantime the Treaty of Berlin had settled the European question, and the Russians could not fight the English without violating that treaty and losing all the advantages they had secured by it. So Kaufmann, the Russian Governor- General, advised Sher ‘Ali to make peace with the British. Sher ‘Ali had been encouraged by the Russians to provoke the hostility of the British, but was deserted by them at the critical moment.
On 20th November the British troops invaded Afghanistan. The Kurram Pass was forced by Roberts, and Qandahar was occupied by General Stewart. In December, Sher ‘Ali retired to Turkestan and died shorty after. His son, Yakub, opened negotiations with the British and on 26th May, 1879, the Treaty of Gandamak was concluded.
The treaty was extremely favourable to the British and conceded all their demands. The Amir agreed to the establishment of a permanent British envoy at Kabul and to conduct his foreign policy on the advice of the Viceroy. He also ceded the districts of Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi to the British. Referring to the Treaty of Gandamak, Lytton observed that by it the British Government secured two objects, that is, the elimination of other foreign influence from Afghanistan and rectification of the Afghan frontier in such a way as to safeguard permanently British influence in that State. Lord Beaconsfield claimed that the treaty had “secured a scientific and adequate frontier for our Indian Empire”.
In accordance with the terms of the treaty, Cavagnari, the British Agent, reached Kabul on 24th July. But he was murdered by mutinous troops on 3rd September. To what extent, if any, the Amir himself was implicated in this plot has never been determined. There is no doubt that Cavagnari displayed lamentable lack of tact in his handling of affairs, and there is equally little doubt that the Amir desired his withdrawal.
The foul murder led to the revival of hostilities. Roberts occupied Kabul on 7th October. Although the Amir had joined the British, he was thought unfit to rule and was removed to India. Negotiations were opened with Sher ‘Ali’s nephew, ‘Abdur Rahman, who was a refugee in Samarqand under Russian protection.
But before the negotiations were brought to a close, the Government of Lord Beaconsfield was succeeded by that of Gladstone. The new Government decided to reverse the whole Afghan policy of their predecessors and even to evacuate the districts ceded by the Treaty of Gandamak. Lord Ripon (1880-84) was accordingly sent as Viceroy to carry out the new policy.
Shortly after the arrival of Lord Ripon (8th June, 1880) the British troops in Qandahar were severelyLord Ripon defeated by Ayub Khan, son of Sher Ali, at Maiwand (July, 1880). Roberts made his famous march from Kabul to Qandhar and completely defeated Ayub’s army. In this he was substantially helped by ‘Abdur Rahman.
Lord Ripon, after studying the situation in India, decided to continue his predecessor’s policy and entered into a treaty with Abdur Rahman. The new Amir agreed, in return for an annual subsidy, to have his foreign policy controlled by the Government of India. The districts ceded by the Treaty of Gandamak were retained by the British.
The Second Afghan War was the outcome of the desire of two rival powers, Russia and England, to establish their influence in Afghanistan. The English statesmen were afraid of a Russian invasion of India through Afghanistan. Whether this menace was a real one may be seriously doubted. There is, however, no doubt that Russia, with a friendly Afghanistan, could bring sufficient pressure on the British, and could not only keep them engaged in the critical time of a European war, but might even use their position as a lever for extorting concessions from the British in Europe. Afghanistan was thus a mere pawn in the European game, and poor Sher ‘Ali was a victim of circumstances for which he was not responsible, and over which he had no control. Strange as it may seem, the Treaty of Berlin was the direct cause of the downfall of Sher ‘Ali.
The Afghan policy of both England and Russia was dictated purely by motives of self-interest, based on an aggressive imperial policy. The forward policy of Lytton and Salisbury can be justified from this point of view alone, as it achieved the main object of British diplomacy, by securing a firm footing in Afghanistan for the British, and removing the Russian menace of including that country within their sphere of influence.
The Russian forward policy received a severe setback by the establishment of the British influence in Afghanistan. But, as if to make up for the lost ground, the Russians now pushed forward their outposts. The fears of the British Government were always allayed by the Russian Foreign Office by profuse professions of pacific intentions, and the aggressive acts were explained as unauthorised acts of local officials or as due to local necessities. At last, when in 1884 Merv was added to Russian possessions, the British entered most emphatic protests. The only result was the acceptance by the Russians of a proposal to delimit the Russo-Afghan boundaries. The Commissioners were appointed on both sides, but those of Russia delayed matters on one pretext or another. In the meantime, the Russian forces were occupying the disputed territories in order to convert their claims into accomplished facts.
