The Central Legislature was thoroughly remodelled and made bi-came-ral, the two chambers being the Council of State and the Legislative Assembly. The members of the Executive Council could become members of one or the other house of the Legislature on nomination by the Governor- General. The Council of State or the Upper Chamber was mainly a revising body. It was to consist of not more than 60 members, 34 of whom were to be elected. Not more than 20 were to be officials. The Legislative Assembly, or the lower and the more popular chamber, was to consist of 140 members. The number was later on raised to 145 of whom 105 were elected, 26 were nominated officials and 14 nominated non-officials. Elections to both the houses were direct and the franchise was based on a high property qualification, that for the Assembly being somewhat wider than that for the Council. The tenure of life of the Council of State was fixed at five years and that of the Assembly at three years. But the Governor- General had the power to dissolve either chamber or, in special circumstances, to extend its tenure. The powers of the two chambers were coordinate, but demands for grants were submitted to the lower house. In case of a deadlock between the two houses, the Governor- General might summon a joint session. The Council of State was to have a President, nominated by the Governor- General from among its members. The Assembly, too, was to have a President and a Deputy President of its own. The President was to be appointed for the first four years by the Governor- General and thereafter to be elected by the chamber itself.
The powers of the Central Legislature were made extensive in theory. In spite of delimitation of functions between the Central and Provincial Governments, the Central Legislature had the power to enact laws for the whole of British India, subject to the limitation that the previous consent of the Govemor-General was necessary for the introduction of Bills in certain matters. Further, if a Bill, recommended by the Governor- General, was thrown out or unsatisfactorily amended by either house, the Governor- General had the power to certify the original Bill as essential for the safety and tranquillity of British India. He was also empowered, in cases of emergency, to promulgate ordinances, which, though originally effective for a period of six months, could be subsequently embodied in law if necessary. Thus the Governor- General was ” an important, if not the predominant, factor of the Indian Legislature “. As regards finance, the Central Legislature was given some control over it with certain specific exceptions. Thus proposals for appropriation of money for purposes of interest and sinking fund charges on loans, for expenditure classified by the Governor- General as political, ecclesiastical and defence, and for the payment of the salaries or pensions of men appointed under the authority of His Majesty or the Secretary of State in Council, were not to be submitted to the vote of the Legislature; but for these an appropriation made by the Government was sufficient. Further, the Governor- General had the power, in case of emergency, to certify any expenditure that he considered essential for the safety and tranquillity of British India or any part thereof. Thus both over legislation and finance the control of the Legislature was in fact greatly limited.
In considering the Provincial Government, we find that the Act of 1919 did away with the distinction between the Regulation Provinces of Bengal, Bombay and Madras and the Non-Regulation Provinces like the Punjab, Assam, etc. All the Provinces, ten in number, with the inclusion of Burma since 1923 and the North-West Frontier Province since 1932, became Governors’ Provinces, each having at its head a Governor, appointed by His Majesty. The Governor of a Province, with enormous powers and privileges, continued to remain as the real authority over it. The Act introduced diarchy or dual government in the Provincial Executive. The Governor with his Executive Council was invested with authority over ” Reserved subjects “, for the administration of which he was responsible not to the Legislature but to the Governor- General and Whitehall. The ” Transferred subjects ” were placed in charge of the Governor acting with his Ministers, who were to be appointed by him from the elected members of the Provincial Legislative Council and whose numbers varied from province to province and in the same province at times. The ministers were to hold office during the pleasure of the Governor, as has been the case in theory in Great Britain and Canada, though by convention and practice, the principle of ministerial responsibility to the Legislature has been established in both these countries. The ministers were required to retain the confidence of the Legislature, but their responsibility to it tended to “demoralise into an irremovable executive “. Further, the Governor’s powers of interference in Transferred subjects were extensive.
The different Provinces were given unicameral legislatures known as Legislative Councils. The membership of each Legislative Council was increased–139 (later on raised to 140) in Bengal, 127 (132) in Madras, 123 in U.P., 111 (114) in Bombay, 103 in Bihar and Orissa, 93 (94) in the Punjab, 70 (73) in the Central Provinces, and 50 (53) in Assam. At least 70 per cent of the members were to be elected, and of the nominated members not more than 20 per cent were to be officials. Different groups like landowners, chambers of commerce and universities; and communities of Muhammadans, Europeans, Anglo-Indians, Indian Christians and Sikhs in the Punjab were given separate representation through their own electorates. During the first four years the Governor of a Province appointed the President of the local Legislature, and on the expiry of that period the Legislative Councils were given the privilege of electing their own President. Each Legislative Council was given the privilege of entertaining a Bill on any subject concerning the Province. No Bill relating to any of the Transferred subjects could be passed without its consent; but a Bill concerning any of the Reserved subjects might become an Act over its head and in spite of its refusal, if the Governor certified that it was necessary in view of his special responsibility for maintaining the safety and tranquillity of the Province. Further, previous consent of the Governor- General was necessary for introducing certain Bills. As regards finance, it was provided that a budget of the estimated income and expenditure, with the exception of certain items was to be placed before the Legislative Council in the form of a demand for grants. So far as the Transferred subjects were concerned, the Council could cut down or refuse any demand. But if in the case of Reserved subjects any demand was rejected or modified by the Council, the Governor had the right to certify the expenditure, as provided for in the original demand, as essential for the discharge of his responsibility. Thus both in matters of law-making and finance, the Council’s authority over Reserved subjects was strictly limited.
