MUGHUL-AFGHAN CONTEST FOR SUPREMACY IN INDIA, A.D. 1526-1556

The NorthWest Frontier

Every government in India has to deal with the complex north-west frontier problem. This region occupiers a position of strategic as well as economic importance, and it is, therefore, highly necessary, for a ruler of India to maintain effective control over it. The Hinduskush range, separating Central Asia from Southern Afghanistan, Baluchistan and India, becomes ‘much less forbidding” in the north of Herat, and through this vulnerable point an external invader from Persia or Central Asia may easily enter the Kabul Valley and India. As the master of Kabul, the Mughul Emperor “must hold Qandahar or his dominion is unsafe. In an age when Kabul was a part of the Delhi Empire, Qandahar was our indispensable first line of defence”.

Qandahar was also an important trade centre, where merchants from different parts of Asia flocked together and exchanged their commodities. Through it goods were carried from India to other Asiatic countries more frequently than before, owing to the Portuguese domination of the Red Sea and their hostile relations with Persia. Further, the turbulent Afghan tribes of the frontier, such as the Uzbegs and the Yusufzais, were “very dangerous in their native hills, being democratic to a degree and fanatically attached to their liberty.

 Fighting in the fastnesses of their country which afford the best of natural defences, they . . . ever resisted any attempts to bring them into subjugation to any of the adjoining monarchies”. Their attitude towards the Mughul Empire was far from friendly, but an imperialist like Akbar could hardly fail to realise the importance of effectively guarding this frontier. He was able to suppress the turbulence of the Uzbegs, whose leader, ‘Abdullah Khan, remained friendly to the Mughul Emperor, and also to defeat the Roshniyas. The Yusufzais, too, were crushingly defeated by a large Mughul army commanded by Raja Todar Mall and Prince Murad. Abul Fazl writes: “A large number of them were killed end many were sold into Turan and Persia. The countries of Sawad (Swat), Bajaur and Buner, which have few equals for climate, fruits and cheapness of food, were cleansed of the evil-doers.” Bhagwan Das and Kasim Khan being deputed at the head of 5,000 men to conquer Kashmir defeated its Sultan, Yusuf Shah, and his son, Ya`qub, in 1586. Kashmir was then annexed to the Empire. Sind and Baluchistan were conquered in 1590-1591 and 1595 respectively.

Qandahar came into the possession of Akbar peacefully. Being harassed by his own relatives and also by the Uzbegs, the Persian governor of Qandahar, Muzaffar Husain Mirza surrendered it to Akbar’s representative, Shah Beg, in A.D. 1595. Thus as a result of Akbar’s policy in the north-west, important territories were added to his empire, its position was made secure on that frontier, and its prestige was immensely enhanced. By the year 1595 he made himself undisputed ruler of the area extending from the Himalayas to the Narmada and from Hindukush to the Brahmaputra, with the exception of a narrow strip of tribal area beyond the Indus and a few other tracts.
Akbar and the Deccan

Having thus consolidated his authority over Northern and Central India, Akbar decided to extend his sovereignty to the Deccan. In this he was but following the traditional policy of earlier northern imperial governments, like those of the Mauryas, the Guptas, the Khaljis and the Tughluqs. He had two definite objects in view. Firstly, with the ideal of an all-India Empire, he naturally sought to bring the Deccan Sultanates, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, Golkunda and Khandesh, under his hegemony. Secondly, as a shrewd statesman, he wanted to utilise his control over the Deccan as a means of pushing back the Portuguese to the sea, because though his relations with them were apparently friendly, he did not think it wise to allow them to enjoy for themselves a part of the economic resources of the country and interfere in its politics. Thus Akbar’s Deccan policy was purely imperialistic in origin and outlook. It was not influenced in the least by religious considerations as was the case, to a certain extent, with Shah Jahan or Aurangzeb.

The Deccan SuItanates were not in a position to defend themselves against the onrush of Mughul imperialism, as they had almost exhausted their strength and sunk into inefficiency by indulging in quarrels among themselves after their temporary alliance against Vijayanagar in A.D. 1564-1565. Akbar first tried to extort from them a formal acknowledgment of his suzerainty over the Deccan by sending ambassadors to their respective courts in 1591. But all, except Khandesh, returned evasive answers to his overtures. The failure of diplomatic missions led him to resort to arms. A large army under Bairam Khan’s son, ‘Abdur Rahim, and the Emperor’s second son, Prince Murad, was sent against Ahmadnagar, which had been weakened by internal quarrels.

 Though the operations of the Mughul army were much hampered, as its two generals did not pull well with each other, Ahmadnagar was besieged by it in 1595. The city was defended with splendid courage and extraordinary resolution by Chand Bibi, a dowager-queen of Bijapur and daughter of Husain Nizam Shah. The besiegers concluded a treaty with Chand Bibi in 1596 whereby Berar was ceded to the Mughuls and the boy king of Ahmadnagar promised to recognise the overlordship of Akbar. But after the departure of the Mughuls, Chand Bibi “resigned her authority”, and a faction at Ahmadnagar, in violation of the treaty, contrary to her will and advice, renewed the war with the Mughuls in the next year with a view to expelling them from Berar. The Mughuls gained a victory over the Deccanis at Supa near Ashti on the Godavari in February, 1597. Internal dissensions prevailed in Ahmadnagar, and Chand Bibi being either “murdered or constrained to take poison”, the city was stormed without difficulty by the imperialists in August, 1600. But the kingdom was not finally annexed to the Empire till the reign of Shah Jahan.