That the result of Lawrence’s policy proved to be disadvantageous to the British nobody can deny. Sher Ali, the new Amir, could not be expected to have a friendly attitude towards a power which refused to come to his help in the most critical moments of his life. Sher ‘Ali could easily realise, what was no doubt the plain truth, “that the English had looked to nothing but their own interests”. He bitterly commented that “Whosesoever side they see strongest for the time being, they turn to him as their friend”.
It was precisely during this period of Afghan turmoil that the Russians resumed their aggressive imperialism in Central Asia. In 1864 they made the first forward move. In 1866 Bukhara was reduced to the position of a dependency. In the very next year was created the new province of Russian Turkestan with headquarters at Tashkhend, about a thousand miles from their former base at Orenburg. In 1868 Samarqand was added to Russian possessions and five years later Khiva followed suit.
The rapid progress of Russia towards Afghanistan could not but be a cause of alarm and anxiety to the Lord MayoBritish. Their first endeavour was therefore to placate the new Amir whom the recent events had so much alienated from the British. Lawrence sent arms and money in 1868 and the subsidy was continued by Lord Mayo (1869-72). How far these methods would have succeeded in regaining the friendship of the Amir, it is difficult to say. But the Russian advance constituted a serious menace to Afghanistan, and hence the Amir was anxious to secure the support of the English. A rapprochement between the two parties was thus rendered easy, and had the English acted with tact and statesmanship they might have completely won over the Amir to their side. Unfortunately, English diplomacy failed miserably at this critical moment, and instead of winning the friendship of the Amir, drove him into the arms of Russia.
A meeting which was held at Ambala in 1869 between the Amir and Lord Mayo offered splendid opportunities for a lasting friendship. The Amir would have conceded all English demands in return for an English guarantee that they would support him against Russia, and would acknowledge no one as Amir of Afghanistan except himself and his descendants. Instead of giving these specific assurances, Lord Mayo merely said in a letter to the Amir that the Government of India would “view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb your position ” and that it would ” further endeavour…… to strengthen the Government of Your Highness “.
The admirers of Mayo have represented the meeting at Ambala as a great success and pretended to believe that Sher ‘Ali was won over to the side of the British. But Sher ‘Ali was too shrewd not to perceive the difference between a specific guarantee and a general assurance of the kind contained in Lord Mayo’s letter. In any case, being alarmed by the Russian occupation of Khiva he sent an Agent to Lord Northbrook, the next Governor- General, in 1873, asking for specific assurance in writing that if Russia or any of its protected or dependent States invaded the Amir’s territories, the British Government would not only help the Amir with arms and money, but also send troops to his aid if necessary.
Lord Northbrook(1872-76) took a wise view of the situation and was willing to accede to the Amir’sLord Northbrook request. Five years earlier, an Indian Viceroy would have probably given such a guarantee on his own responsibility, referring his action for ratification to the Secretary of State. But the establishment of the direct telegraph line between India and London introduced a great change in the relations between the Governor- General and the Secretary of State. So in a telegram to the Secretary of State, dated 24th July, 1873, he proposed to assure the Amir “that if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations, we will help him with money, arms and troops if necessary to expel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity”.
The proposal was, however, rejected by the Secretary of State, as the ministry of Gladstone was unwilling to have a rupture with Russia, and did not view the Russian expansion in Central Asia as dangerous to the safety and security of either Afghanistan or India. Under the instructions of the Home Government, Lord Northbrook could only assure the Amir that ” we shall maintain our settled policy in Afghanistan”. The Amir naturally interpreted it as unwillingness on the part of the English to afford him protection against Russia.
Two other events occurred about this time, which further alienated the Amir. The British Government unwisely accepted the task of arbitrating between the claims of Persia and Afghanistan over the boundaries in Seistan. As the decision of the British went in some details against Afghanistan the Amir resented it as act of injustice. In the second place, when the Amir chose his son ‘Abdullah Jan as heir apparent and communicated his derision to the Government of India, Lord Northbrook refused to recognise him as such, and the Amir was convinced that ‘Abdullah Jan would receive no more support from the British than he himself had obtained in fighting his rivals for the throne.
Utterly disgusted at the attitude of the English, the Amir naturally longed for a good understanding with the Russians, and they eagerly seized the opportunity. Although they admitted that Afghanistan was beyond their sphere of interest, they carried on correspondence with the Amir and tried to ingratiate themselves into his favour. The Russian correspondence gradually increased and its bearers, treated by the Amir as agents of the Russian Government were almost always present in Kabul.
In the meantime there was a change in the Home Government. In 1874 Disraeli succeeded Gladstone, and Lord Salisbury became the Secretary of State for India. Two years later Northbrook was succeeded by Lord Lytton (1876-80) as Viceroy. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877 strained the relations between Russia and England, and a war between the two appeared almost inevitable. The pendulum now swung violently in the opposite direction. The new Cabinet at once decided to keep a firm hold on Afghan affairs to prevent the influence of Russia in that region.
The first measure they adopted was the annexation of Quetta. It occupied a strategic position on the frontier, as it controlled the route to Qandahar, and could turn the flank of an army invading India through the Khyber Pass. A treaty was concluded with the Khan of Kalat, and Quetta was occupied in 1877.
The second objective of the new Cabinet was the establishment of a British agent at Herat, so that the Government might be constantly supplied with accurate information regarding the Russian movements on the frontier. Lord Northbrook, who continued as Viceroy till 1876, and the majority of his Council, were opposed to the policy. They thought the Amir was sure to refuse it and the result would be another war. Lord Salisbury insisted on his view. Lord Northbrook thereupon resigned his viceroyalty, and Lord Lytton was appointed Viceroy to carry out the new policy. The Amir was offered the term he asked for in 1873, but nevertheless he refused to accept any British Mission. He pointed out that in that case he could hardly refuse to accept a similar mission from the Russians. In the meantime the Amir’s relations with Russia grew more intimate. In June, 1878, the Russian Governor- General sent his officer, Stolietoff, to the Amir with a draft treaty which conceded the terms which the Amir had asked of the British in 1873, and Lord Lytton was ready to offer in 1878. The Despatch of the envoy was accompanied by that of three columns of troop from Tashkhend towards the Afghan frontier. Stolietoff was ordered by the Amir not to enter Afghanistan, but he ignored the orders and reached Kabul on 22nd July. There he negotiated a treaty with the Amir, offering him guarantee against foreign attack.
